An additional mission was "to improve the Vietnamese Navy's counter-insurgency capabilities and assist Vietnamese and U. S. Forces to secure the coastal regions and major rivers in order to defeat the Communist insurgency in Vietnam.". Our operational boats would be the first to complete turnover. Minesweeping and Interdiction Division 93, Historical Information on the Vietnamese Navy. Early effort notwithstanding, the Viet Cong successfully mined one ship each in 1965 and 1966 (the SS Eastern Mariner and the SS Baton Rouge Victory respectively). The companion piece to this tragedy, often conveniently forgotten by later critics of the war and self-styled pacifists, was the liquidation of perhaps 50,000 "enemies of the people, by the Communists own estimate, during the consolidation of Viet Minh rule in the North. It was the function of these centers to coordinate patrols of the two navies, but in practice some duplication occurred. Captain Phans command was marred by extreme factionalism within his navy, the exiling of many senior naval officers, and inept leadership. (6) That ComNavForV administer all naval construction in Vietnam. After Market Time broke the sea end of this chain, the logistics flow reversed itself and the local Viet Cong were supplied with necessary munitions infiltrated from the north. In December, an operation called Silver Mace, involving the first open sea transit of heavy riverine assault craft, struck at these barricades and in three days removed them. The Interdiction Barriers. From Nam Can the Communist supply chain ran northward into the remainder of the Delta and into III Corps. Stripped of its top leadership, and its remaining officers in a state of high excitement and confusion, the Vietnamese Navy careened along an uncertain path. There was a great deal of flexibility built into ACTOV. Furthermore, a large percentage of the Vietnamese Navy was recruited from relatively well-to-do city populations who preferred the smaller risks of that service to those offered by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). A sapper group, Doan-10, had been identified. New tactics were devised; new strategies tested. The remainder would have to be sought elsewhere. That night (16-17 February) the requested air strikes and illumination failed to materialize. On 25 September 1967 the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division) was activated to control the blocking force, replacing the provisional task force HQ. Although the Chief, Naval Advisory Group was the senior naval officer in Vietnam, he was not in actuality a commander. Prior to his departure, Rear Admiral Veth had recommended to General Abrams and to the Chief of Naval Operations a plan to turn over two River Assault Squadrons (roughly the equivalent of six Vietnamese Navy River Assault Groups) by the end of the fiscal year 1969- Vice Admiral Zumwalt proposed to expand that plan so that virtually all U. S. Navy operational responsibilities in Vietnam with the equipment necessary for meeting them, would be turned over by 30 June 1970. Vessels in the contiguous zone, extending 12 miles from the coast, suspected as infiltrators were also made subject to search and seizure. We learned about theses guys in SEAL history during BUD/S. At one time charcoal preparation was an important source of the areas meager wealth. In September 1965, Rear Admiral Ward raised the question of naval command relationships in Vietnam with CNO and with General Westmoreland. By the fall of 1965, U. S. Navy units in Vietnam included: (1) the Marines in I Corps; (2) Navy support personnel under ComPhibPacs command at Da Nang and Chu Lai (on 1 October Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, was established under ComUSMACVs operational control and PhibPac support terminated); (3) Construction Battalions in I Corps and Seabee Teams throughout the country who also worked under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam; (4) the Officer in Charge of Construction and his organization; (5) the Naval Advisory Group; (6) the Headquarters Support Activity, Saigon (whose responsibilities were being phased out and taken over by the U. S. Army); (7) the Military Sea Transportation Service Office, Vietnam; and (8) numerous smaller activities. They are attached to nearly every Vietnamese naval unit. Normally, each patrol area was the responsibility of a DER or, if sufficient DERs were not available, an MSO. Seemingly from nowhere, skilled masons appeared and began the painstaking reconstruction of the areas once ubiquitous beehive charcoal kilns. These units got underway each morning from Sea Float and returned each night. Embarked were 10 PBRS, a helicopter fire team, and two Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles (PACVs). The next day, 18 February, a conference was held in Nha Trang with Brigadier General William E. Depuy, U. S. Army, of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam J-3 staff; presiding. In the meantime, TF 116, Game Warden, had been established (on 18 December 1965) with an assigned mission "to assist the Government of South Vietnam in denying the enemy the use of the major rivers of the Delta and the Rung Sat Special Zone. Rear Admiral Ward was assigned additional duty as CTF 116. [9] Establishment [ edit] The operational forces had undergone many changes in organization and strength. The proposal was thoroughly discussed at ComNavForV headquarters. Lieutenant Bowers promptly notified the Second Coastal Zone Senior Advisor, Lieutenant Commander Harvey P. Rodgers, U. S. Navy, in Nha Trang. There was, in addition, opposition within the Joint General Staff of the Vietnamese Armed Forces for any aggrandizement of the Vietnamese Navy, which has always been the political inferior of the ARVN. English language leaflets were floated to the MATSB on tiny wooden rafts. The task force was activated on 24 February with headquarters at Tan My, under the operational control of Commanding General, III MAF. The Rung Sat was the one area where the Navy had, so to speak, a piece of the ground war (responsibility for military operations there rested with the Vietnamese Navy), and as Senior Advisor to the Vietnamese Navy the Admiral considered his position to be somewhat analogous to that of a Senior Advisor to one of the Combat Tactical Zones. The enormity of this undertaking could not be measured solely in terms of the numbers of the Vietnamese naval personnel it would be necessary to recruit and train. Commander, Naval Forces Vietnam - Wikipedia A great deal of attention was of course paid to weather forecasting, and the transit was accomplished in the Gulf of Thailand's "good weather" part of the year. It was reorganized on 15 May 1964 and absorbed MAAG Vietnam to its command when combat unit deployment became too large for advisory group control. Sealords: the Riverine Interdiction Campaign a Thesis in History - Tdl At the time, the Military Assistance Advisory Group was the only U.S. military headquarters in South Vietnam. By end of year, 254 Sailors were assigned to MACV and NAG. The original MACV Headquarters were colocated with MAAG at 606 Trn Hng o, Cholon. Unquestionably, the Navys ACTOV program was in the van of the general movement to Vietnamize the war. Frequently, these were individuals who by reason of age or infirmity were ineligible for service in the Uniformed Services. Enemy reaction to this unwanted presence in his midst took the form of increased mining and ambush of Swiftboat patrols, and a vigorous psychological warfare operation of his own. The Junk Force was notorious for "gun-decking its operational reports. If you have a conquering spirit and are not afraid of even the most complex problems, apply now to Naval Group! A span of the Phung Hiep bridge was raised early in the morning with the assistance of the Army Engineers, and two River Assault Divisions with troops embarked passed 14 miles up the supposedly "inaccessible" Cai Con Canal for an assault on Viet Cong positions. 7 In this sense "pacify" means: establishing control over the people who live on the banks, ending Viet Cong tax extortion, denying the waterways to enemy use, while at the same time, restoring the use of the waterways to friendly civilian and military use. Following the closure of MACV and the establishment of the DAO, the MACV Headquarters became the DAO Compound. [3]:45 In May 1965, the Army's 173d Airborne Brigade from Okinawa arrived. But it was a necessary business and the Brown Water sailor attacked the job of getting it done with the same enthusiasm he had shown in seeking out the enemy on the rivers and canals of the Delta. $9.99; $9.99; Publisher Description. This ushered in nearly three years of turmoil in the senior Vietnamese Navy leadership. In April 1966, all Army communications-electronics resources in South Vietnam were combined in a single formation, the 1st Signal Brigade. Overview: American leaders established the Military Assistance Advisory Command, Vietnam, in May 1964. Until quite recently all fresh water had to be brought in by sampan from settlements in the north. The MSOs were not themselves permitted to intercept suspect shipping, but used their radar to vector Vietnamese naval units to suspicious contacts. Part of the increase in the number of attacks on shipping could be attributed to the longer range weapons then coming into use. On 21 February 1965, the Commander of the U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam requested the Commander-in-Chief Pacific and the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet to send representatives to Saigon to plan a combined U. S.-Vietnamese Navy patrol effort. The American boat captain would be the last to leave, and control and ownership of the boat would remain with the U. S. as long as he was aboard. Forces initially at the disposal of the Clearwater task force commander included TF 116 PBRs, helicopter gunships, attack aircraft, artillery, and ground security troops. At the beginning of the "American period, the Vietnamese Navy had a fleet of over 100 modified landing craft, two LSMs, two PCEs, and three MSCs, almost all of which had originally been transferred to the French through the American naval aid program during the Indochina War. Selected Documents prepared by the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam War History. There was literally nowhere in the Delta, given navigable water, that the Riverine Assault Force could not go. The feeble political position of the Vietnamese Navy in the General Staff organization made it almost totally subservient to Army control, and to commanders who were often ignorant of how to exploit Navy capabilities. At the end of 1964 there were 235 sailors assigned to MACV duties which included support functions in the Saigon area, construction and medical activities, and advising the South Vietnamese Navy and the marine corps. "River Patrol Relearned, by Commander S. A. Swarztrauber, U. S. Navy, in Naval Review 1970. Significant improvement in the existing structure and performance of the Vietnamese Navy would also be required. The two navies together operated more than 300 amphibious ships and craft, 75 patrol vessels and minesweepers, two cruisers, and two aircraft carriers. "The Case for Inshore Warfare, by Commander W. F. Searle, Jr., U. S. Navy, in Naval Review 1966. The former had six River Assault Groups (RAGs) which were patterned after the old French Division Naval DAssaut, but with two significant differences. With few exceptions, the Coastal Groups (the Junk bases) are located in areas considered undesirable for duty. The increase in Vietnamese naval manpower, a modest sign of change at best, is a typical example of the handicaps suffered by the program. In the fall of that year a joint State-Defense Survey Mission visited Vietnam. of the Army Pamphlet 672-3. (3) That NavForV not include III MAF, which would continue under the operational command of CinCPacFlt and operational control of ComUSMACV. Specific activities which were initiated included: In all, it was estimated that the growing Vietnamese Navy would require 14,000 housing units. In spite of changes in the turnover plans, which required the recruiting and training of nearly 10,000 additional Vietnamese Navymen and the transfer of a proportionately larger number of craft, five-sixths of all operational craft would be turned over by June 1970, and the rest by December of that year. When the III Marine Amphibious Force moved to Da Nang on 6 May 1965, its commanding general, Major General William R. Collins, was designated MACV's naval component commander. For a time, U. S. and French naval advisors worked together in a combined training mission called TRIM, but for all practical purposes the U. S. Navy had assumed primary responsibility for advising the Vietnamese Navy in the fall of 1955. Near the firing line, supply operations had to be carried out in the shortest possible time. Two corps-level HQs were established in 1965-66, Task Force Alpha (soon to become I Field Force, Vietnam) for U.S. forces in the II Corps Tactical Zone and II Field Force, Vietnam, for U.S. Army forces in the III Corps Tactical Zone. U. S. Marines, traditionally the force trained and equipped for amphibious assault operations, were not available, already having been committed in maximum strength to the I Corps Tactical Zone. Thanks VetFriends. His long-time associate and premier, Ngo Dinh Diem, announced on 7 July 1955 that a referendum would be held in October to permit the people to choose between Bao Dai and himself. This added to the commands existing security vulnerabilities and communications difficulties. They were accompanied by the USS Mercer (APB-39) and the USS Satyr (ARL-23). By the fall of 1968, on the eve of the introduction of the U. S. naval command's Accelerated Turnover (ACTOV) Program, the personnel strength of the Vietnamese Navy was more than 17,500. Vast numbers of people live on or near the rivers, canals, and seacoasts. The Nam Can district of An Xuyen Province is located on the southernmost tip of the Ca Mau peninsula, some 150 miles southwest of Saigon. The PCFs and the ISIL inspected traffic on the river, and provided protection for the hospital ship while it conducted its civil action program. VMH: Vietnam - usnamemorialhall.org As a final step in the ACTOV program, the advisory effort would be phased out. However, the Naval Advisory Group also served in an operational role between March 1965 and 1 April 1966 when NAVFORV was created. The primary mission of Market Time at this period was "to conduct surveillance, gunfire support, visit and search, and other operations as directed along the coast of the Republic of Vietnam in order to assist the Republic of Vietnam in detection and prevention of Communist infiltration from the sea." U.S. Navy SEAL Teams from Establishment through Operation Urgent Fury If the Vietnamese Navy were to continue effective operations in the area after the withdrawal of the U. S. Navy, some sort of an operational and support base would be required. MACV was first implemented to assist the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Vietnam, controlling every advisory and assistance effort in Vietnam. It was the Admirals view at the time that "Vietnamese Navy participation is the key to the success of this operation. To underscore the importance of the cooperative aspects of the venture, a Vietnamese naval officer was assigned as second in command of the MATSB. These and subsequent operations in the Nam Can during the first half of 1969 relied heavily on offshore support ships (primarily LSTs and ARLs), which, because of very shallow water, had to anchor about five miles off the Ca Mau peninsula. It appears to be sparsely populated in comparison with the rest of the Delta, but an accurate census has never been taken. The minimum requirement established was that pilot programs be underway and materials stockpiled to complete construction with the arrival of the first dependents at the ACTOV bases. In following months additional equipment was transferred to the Vietnamese Navy, primarily patrol craft, and accelerated training of both officers and enlisted men began; some of it in schools in the United States. The river hamlets, for all their bogs and sloughs of mud, were alive with activity and sparkled with the laughter of children. The concept of the proposed river patrol operations was that they would not be a part of Market Time, but would be directed by the same officer, the Chief, Naval Advisory Group. The popular conception of the enemy in Vietnam is that he is an ephemeral figure who travels light, lives off the land, and at the moment of battle somehow always manages to supply himself with arms and munitions dug up from long-buried caches, or plucked magically from the hollow stumps of jungle trees. Robert Cameron. [9], A multi-service organization was required to plan for the application of U.S. air and naval power into North or South Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, should this be required and ordered. Vietnamese ground commanders, and some of their American advisors, thought that such a base would be virtually indefensible. What could not be moved in was often manufactured in concealed munitions factories by using scrap and dud rounds which were in plentiful supply. A second attempt was made several hours later, moderate opposition was again experienced, and the ships once more withdrew. The Communists merely moved to smaller waterways when they were forced off the large rivers. Compensation would be paid by the Government of South Vietnam if they proved to be foreign ships. Such a conception is of course largely romantic. Neither was available. His command and control decisions were shaped by the following principles: (1) U. S. Navy operations in Vietnam would be coordinated with Vietnamese Operations, allowing integrated operations to be instituted as soon as practicable; (2) facilities required for U. S. naval operations would be located with Vietnamese naval installations so that support operations could be integrated, and later turnover of the facilities more practically achieved. In 1963, Vietnamese patrols searched a reported 135,911 junks and 388,725 people, of whom only 6 were determined to be infiltrators. It is a bitter pill for a whole generation of American "nation builders to swallow, but the brutal fact is that no Vietnamese Government until possibly the present one inspired in its people the loyalty, the unhesitating support, the patriotism and spirit of self-sacrifice essential to the welding of an effective defense force. It is hard and demanding work. History [ edit] A logistics establishment already existed at Saigon when major U.S. forces came ashore in South Vietnam in 1965. The consequences of this bitter infighting for the operational effectiveness of the Vietnamese Navy, in this period, may well be imagined. The duty mostly required time riding the rivers on U. S. Navy boats that had been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. Power saws and modern lumbering techniques have not yet been introduced in the Nam Can. He could have been a SEAL or Riverine, some something in between. On 7 August, a Joint Resolution of the Congress affirmed that the United States would continue to support the Republic of Vietnam and "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States. By the end of the year, the U. S. military strength in Vietnam numbered about 23,000 officers and men. In contrast to the carrier, amphibious, and naval gunfire support forces and, at least during early 1965, the coastal patrol force, which Commander Seventh Fleet directed, the Navy's forces within South Vietnam were operationally controlled by COMUSMACV. In the plan, great reliance was placed on "on-the-job" training, and it was hoped that by living with, and operating with, our Brown Water sailors the VNN sailors would learn much by example. NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP VIETNAM Air Force Units Army Units Coast Guard Units Marine Corps Units Navy Units Become a VetFriends Member Site Map Search Veterans & Personnel Photos, Humor, Stories & More Military Records & Resources Reunions, Parades, & Events Online Catalog About VetFriends My Profile MetLife Veteran Insurance Discounts Contact Us The first permanent United States naval presence in Vietnam was established in August 1950, soon after the outbreak of the Korean War, when the Navy Section of Military Assistance Advisory Group, Indo china, was formed in Saigon with Commander James B. Cannon, U. S. Navy, and seven officers and men. Young trees are cut into long, straight poles, stripped of their bark, and sold for construction purposes. Naval Advisory Group Vietnam United States Marine Corps Strength Group Type HQ/Command Elements Years 1966 - 1973 Report To Major Commands Reporting Units 147th Marine Brigade (RVN) USMC Advisory Unit USMC Advisory Team Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) Members Who Served in Naval Advisory Group Vietnam Service Plaque Full Service History A most significant factor was the deplorable care, housing, and security of dependent families. By the summer of 1966, nearly 50 per cent of the senior officers of the Navy were either out of the country or assigned to non-Navy duties in the country. Overall command of the navies was exercised by Commander French Naval Forces Far East, who was himself directly subordinate to the theater commander, Commander in Chief, Armed Forces Indochina. The tactic of keeping the enemy constantly on the move, never surrendering the initiative, and denying him a secure base area completely changed the complexion of the war in the "Forest of Assassins." [8]:26870, On 2 July 1966 construction started on a new purpose-built facility. If you served in Advisory Team 143, Naval Advisory Group Vietnam, Join TWS for free to reconnect with service friends. of Defense in South Vietnam (1962-73), U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. With the elapse of five months, all the three same brigades remained in the new division, but the brigade at Chu Lai was now named the 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, after a responsibility swap that had occurred in August. ComNavForV directed all commands to make a maximum effort to mobilize local construction equipment and to obtain excess materials in support of the Self-Help shelter program. Thus, the American sailors who realized that a member of their "team" was going to be replaced in a short time could be expected to see to it that the new replacement really did know how to operate, for example, the after machine gun. The two Vietnamese RAIDS promptly began operations on the Giant Slingshot barrier. In time a new hamlet was established at the site. Navy Vietnam Patches | Flying Tigers Surplus Well documented infiltration routes had been traced, and it was one of the three aims of Sea Lords to bar these where they crossed or followed navigable water. The force levels decided upon in September 1965 were later increased, and thus it may be assumed they were not in themselves sufficient. A concerted and innovative psychological operation might succeed in winning the people to active support of the government of Vietnam, the majority of whom were judged to be apolitical. * In a third category are the divisional records of particular offices (i.e., Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations). A period of 300 days was set aside for the phased withdrawal of Viet Minh and French military forces to the north and south of that line respectively. [2]:59. A small U.S. military headquarters was needed to continue the military assistance program for the southern Republic of Vietnam Military Forces and supervise the technical assistance still required to complete the goals of Vietnamization. Air power, to be sure, could further that pursuit and proved invaluable in support of our boats when they were caught up in a fire fight, but a lesson that was learned in the Indochina War and which was re-learned in the Vietnam War, is that air power has only limited effectiveness in a counterinsurgency war and in the interdiction of enemy lines of communication through difficult and largely trackless terrain. On 30 April, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara approved the eventual transfer of the operational control of Market Time to the Chief, Naval Advisory Group (CNAG), as the agent for Com USMACV. The Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG-7), for example, had an effective range nearly three times that of the older RPG-2. The first capture of infiltrators by a U. S. Navy ship occurred late in May, when the USS Back (DD-761) boarded a junk near the seventeenth parallel. It was not proposed that "Vietnamization" of the naval war would include the transfer of the large units which made offshore support of the Nam Can operations feasible, if less than desirable for the U. S. Navy. In August new combined operations were launched against the base camp areas in the Nhon Trach "sanctuary" area outside of the Rung Sat, which was a much harder area for the Viet Cong to hide in. Sea Float sailors constructed schools in each of the two newly settled hamlets. This had been largely accomplished with river patrols, drastic defoliation, mine sweeping, and by hunting the enemy on land. Monsoon winds and the long fetch over shallow water combined to produce frequent periods of unfavorable sea conditions for small boat operations. However, on 30 September 1968, when Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., the first naval officer of three-star rank to be assigned to Vietnam, relieved Rear Admiral Kenneth L. Veth as Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, the personnel strength of the Navy command stood at 38,386. The advisory effort, meanwhile, grew rapidly. The NAVFORV and Naval Advisory Group records fall into several main series. In addition to the Market Time raiders, the following forces were employed: SEALS, UDT/EOD teams, Mobile Strike Force and RF/PF troops, Coastal Group junks, tactical strike aircraft supplied as needed by the U. S. Army, Navy, or Air Force, and helicopter gunships. 220th Aviation Company "Catkillers" Web Page [8]:270. Captain R. S. Salzer, U. S. Navy, was the first officer to function as "First Sea Lord," and upon his detachment the post was assumed by Rear Admiral W. H. House, Deputy ComNavForV. January 28, 1969 (38 years old) Distinguished Flying Cross, Operational loss, Vietnam, 559th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Fixed Wing, USNA 22nd Company. It pointed out, however, the essential futility of a sea quarantine in the absence of an accompanying effort to block inland infiltration routes. U.S. [4]:327 These statistics could of course be interpreted two ways; either there was little sea infiltration, or the counter-infiltration effort was remarkably ineffective. Under the terms of the Geneva agreement, a military demarcation line was established near the seventeenth parallel in Vietnam. Contact with a generally elusive enemy was established on seven occasions. Daily coastal surveillance flights by SP-2 aircraft, operating from Tan Son Nhut, had begun shortly after the conference of 3 March 1965.
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